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Multiple Punishments for
Similar Crimes: Isthe
Double Jeopardy Clause Violated?
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by Jimmy Gurule

Jimmy Gurule is associate
professor of law at Notre Dame
Law School, Notre Dame, IN;
(219) 631-5917.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONST., amend
V. As the Supreme Court observed in
North Carolinav. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969), the Double Jeopardy
Clause embodies three constitutional protections. In Pearce, the Court
declared that the Clause "protects
against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal, against
a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction, and against
multiple punishments for the same
offense." 395 U.S. at 717.
When two statutes punish the
same conduct and the defendant is
convicted of each offense in a single
prosecution, does imposing cumulative punishment violate the
protections afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause? The critical
inquiry is whether or not the legislature intended cumulative punishment for the offenses. If the legislature clearly expressed its intent that
cumulative punishment should be
imposed, principles of double jeopardy are not offended. See Garrettv.
United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).

ISSUE
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause
bar entry of judgments of conviction
and the imposition of concurrent
sentences on a defendant convicted
in a single proceeding of conspiracy
to distribute a controlled substance
and conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, when the two offenses are based on the same criminal
agreement?

Glance
Criminal defendants often
are charged and convicted of multiple offenses.
And often one offense is a
lesser included offense of

FACTS
Tommy Lee Rutledge was the leader
of a large drug organization that distributed multikilogram quantities of
cocaine from 1988 to 1990. He
allegedly bought cocaine from the
Latin Kings street gang in Chicago,
Illinois, for distribution in Warren
County, in northern Illinois. In
1991, Rutledge was indicted for various federal drug and firearms offenses, including operating a continuing
criminal enterprise ("CCE") in violation 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988); conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distributing
(Continued on Page 105)

another, which means
that proving one offense
proves the other. If the
offender is sentenced for
both crimes, is the prohibition against double
jeopardy violated? That is
the question the Supreme
Court addresses in this
drug trafficking case, a
case in which two concurrent life imprisonment
sentences were imposed
for virtually the
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same conduct.
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cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); possessing a firearm after
being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); and using
or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
After a jury trial in the federal district court, Rutledge was convicted
on all counts. At sentencing, the district court imposed separate terms
of life imprisonment on the CCE,
drug conspiracy, and drug distribution convictions. The court imposed
other terms of imprisonment on the
firearms convictions, but these
convictions are not at issue. The
judgment of the district court specified that the life sentences imposed
on the CCE and the drug conspiracy
violations would run concurrently.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
Rutledge maintained that the entry
of separate judgments of conviction
on the CCE and conspiracy charges
and the imposition of separate, concurrent sentences for those offenses
violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
While the Seventh Circuit agreed
that "the conspiracy charge is a
lesser included offense of the CCE
charge," it nonetheless explicitly
rejected Rutledge's double jeopardy
argument. 40 F.3d 879, 886
(7th Cir. 1994).
The Seventh Circuit opined that
"concurrent sentences may be
imposed for conspiracy and CCE
provided the cumulative punishment
does not exceed the maximum
under the CCE act." The court held
that "by imposing concurrent
sentences, the district court did not
impose a cumulative penalty, and
Rutledge's sentence is proper."
40 F.3d at 886.
Finding no violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Seventh
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Circuit affirmed Rutledge's convictions and sentences for CCE and
conspiracy. It is this decision that
the Supreme Court reviews, having
granted Rutledge's petition for a writ
of certiorari. 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995).
CASE ANALYSIS
The facts in this case implicate the
double jeopardy bar against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
In determining if the imposition of
concurrent sentences for drug-related conspiracy and for conducting a
CCE offends the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the dispositive question is
whether or not Congress intended
that an offender be punished separately for each offense. If Congress
has not authorized cumulative
penalties, double jeopardy prohibits
such punishment. See Garrett,
471 U.S. at 778.
Rutledge maintains that the
Supreme Court answered this
threshold question against the
Government in Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (plurality
opinion). (Refer to Glossary for the
definition of plurality opinion.)
In Jeffers, the defendant was indicted for conspiring to distribute illicit
drugs; in a separate indictment, the
defendant was charged with operating a CCE. Jeffers opposed the
Government's pretrial motion to
consolidate the two trials, arguing
that he would be prejudiced. The
district court agreed, and the
conspiracy and CCE charges were
prosecuted in separate trials.
Jeffers was convicted in both criminal proceedings. In the first trial on
the drug conspiracy charge, Jeffers
was sentenced to a 15-year term of
imprisonment and fined $25,000. In
the second trial on the CCE charge,
he was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined $100,000, the
sentence to run consecutively to the
prior sentence for conspiracy.

Jeffers appealed, claiming that under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, his
CCE conviction and sentence
imposed after a conviction and
sentence for drug conspiracy
constituted multiple prosecution
and the imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense.
The Supreme Court rejected Jeffers'
argument, holding that the second
prosecution did not offend double
jeopardy principles because Jeffers
had opposed having the CCE and
conspiracy charges prosecuted in a
single proceeding. In effect, the
Court reasoned that Jeffers had
waived any double jeopardy claim
he may have had.
The Court, however, did take exception to the cumulative fines imposed
at the second sentencing, fines that,
taken together, exceeded the maximum $100,000 fine permitted under
the CCE statute. Four Justices concluded that Congress did not intend
"to allow cumulative punishment for
violations of Sections 846 and 848."
432 U.S. at 157. Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case with an
instruction to the district court that
the cumulative fines imposed against
Jeffers could not exceed the maximum permitted under the CCE
statute. Interestingly, the Court left
intact the cumulative, consecutive
prison sentences imposed in the two
proceedings for violations of
Sections 846 and 848.
Rutledge interprets Jeffers to
preclude cumulative punishment for
drug conspiracy and CCE convictions and construes cumulative
punishment to encompass the imposition of concurrent sentences. The
United States, on the other hand,
argues that Jeffers only prohibits
imposition of cumulative punishment that exceeds the maximum
sentence prescribed for a CCE
conviction.

Issue No. 3

The Government stresses that the
Jeffers Court only remanded the
case on the issue of the imposition of
cumulative fines that exceeded the
statutory maximum. The Court did
not disturb Jeffers' dual convictions
and cumulative prison sentences on
the drug conspiracy and CCE
convictions because, even served
consecutively, they did not exceed
the maximum prison sentence under
the CCE statute, which is life.
Similarly, since Rutledge's separate
terms of life imprisonment for conspiracy and CCE were imposed to
run concurrently, the Government
asserts that the sentences do not
exceed the maximum sentence
permitted for a CCE.

Rutledge's point of view, the Court
in Ball stressed that punishment
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy
Clause includes "a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition
of sentence." 470 U.S. at 861.
In Ball, the Supreme Court had two
grounds for concluding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause forbids
even the entry of a second judgment
of conviction in cases where the
legislature did not intend cumulative punishment. First, the entry of
multiple judgments of conviction
might result in an increased sentence under some recidivist statute
implicated at some later time, and
"the second conviction may be used
to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal
stigma accompanying any criminal
conviction." 470 U.S. at 865.
Rutledge maintains that both of
those concerns are present when a
defendant is convicted of conspiracy
and operating a CCE. Thus, under
Ball, Rutledge maintains that the
separate judgment of conviction for
conspiracy must be vacated.

In this case, the Supreme Court is
called on to clarify its earlier result
in Jeffers. Did Congress intend to
prohibit the imposition of a sentence
in addition to a sentence imposed
for operating a CCE, or did
Congress merely intend to prohibit
cumulative sentences that exceed
the maximum sentence permitted
for conducting a CCE?
Rutledge advances a second major
argument. Relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Ball v. United
States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985),
Rutledge maintains that the double
jeopardy bar against multiple
punishments not only prohibits the
imposition of separate sentences but
also precludes the entry of separate
judgments of convictions for both
offenses.
In Ball, the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not intend to permit
cumulative punishment for the same
conduct that resulted in violations of
two separate statutes, one statute
that prohibited receiving a firearm
by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h)(1), and one that prohibited
possessing the same firearm by
a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a)(1). Of significance from
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In opposition, the United States
argues that the threat of adverse
consequences in this case is much
less than in Ball. First, the
Government maintains that with
respect to sentencing under
recidivist provisions, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines would not
produce an enhanced sentence in
subsequent sentencing merely
because of the entry of dual
convictions for conspiracy and CCE.
Second, with respect to the societal
stigma or use of the second
conviction for impeachment, the
Government argues that the CCE
offense is one of the most serious
federal criminal offenses, and it is
doubtful that a defendant, once
convicted of CCE, would suffer any
incremental stigma as the result of
being convicted of a Section 846
drug conspiracy.

Finally, the United States asserts a
practical consideration militating
against vacating a conspiracy
conviction and sentence. If the
Supreme Court were to hold that
the Double Jeopardy Clause mandates vacating both the entry of a
Section 846 judgment of conviction
and sentence and the defendant
were successful in having the CCE
conviction overturned on appeal,
the defendant would reap a windfall
by avoiding punishment altogether
for the conspiracy conviction.
Certainly, the Government maintains, Congress did not intend
this result.
To avoid this legal dilemma in the
event Rutledge were to prevail on
his double jeopardy argument, the
Government urges the Court to
adopt the approach taken by the
Second Circuit of merging the two
convictions into a single conviction
so that only one remains. See
United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d
621 (2d cir. 1985). Under that
approach, "the conviction for the
lesser offense would cease to exist
unless the conviction for the
greater offense should be reversed,
in which event the defendant could
be punished for the lesser offense."
771 F.2d at 632. Thus, if the CCE
conviction were reversed on
appeal, a court could reinstate the
conspiracy conviction so that the
offender would not avoid punishment. Any time already served
would be counted against the sentence imposed on the conspiracy
conviction.

(Continued on Page 107)
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SIGNIFICANCE
The issue of whether or not entry of
separate judgments of conviction and
concurrent sentences for drug conspiracy and CCE convictions violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause has
divided the federal circuits. While a
majority of circuits have interpreted
the Double Jeopardy Clause to
require that a Section 846 conspiracy conviction and sentence be
vacated, four circuits have departed
from this position.
In addition to the Second Circuit in
Aiello, the Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have adopted other
approaches. In United States v.
Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1990), the Third Circuit allowed
retention of both the conspiracy and
the CCE convictions but required
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that any sentence imposed for a
conviction on the lesser included
conspiracy charge be vacated. And,
in United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d
1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991), the
Ninth Circuit directed the district
court to impose a sentence on the
CCE count and an alternative
sentence on the conspiracy conviction. The conspiracy conviction and
sentence would then be vacated
subject to the condition that the
CCE conviction is not reversed on
appeal. The Seventh Circuit, as
reflected in Rutledge v. United
States, would permit both conspiracy and CCE convictions and sentences to stand as long as the cumulative sentences for both offenses do
not exceed the maximum sentence
for operating a CCE.

These conflicting views of the
Double Jeopardy Clause have yielded inconsistent and seemingly unfair
results depending on where a defendant is tried and convicted on drug
conspiracy and CCE charges. It is
anticipated that the Supreme Court's
decision in this case will address
these concerns and resolve the conflict by announcing a uniform rule.

ATTORNEYS OF THE
PARTIES
For Tommy L. Rutledge (Barry
Levenstam; Jenner & Block;
(312) 222-9350).
For the United States (Drew S. Days,
III, Solicitor General; Department of
Justice; (202) 514-2217).

Issue No. 3

